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NOTES
INCOME TAX PROVISIONS OF THE CHANDLER ACT
I
Included in the recent revision of the National Bankruptcy Act were several
provisions controlling the extent to which taxable income may arise from a reduction or cancellation of indebtedness in a corporate reorganization proceeding
under Chapter X., Before considering these provisions it is necessary to consider the effect of cancellation of indebtedness under previous tax laws. Reduction or cancellation in indebtedness may be income, or it may be a gift or a
capital transaction, depending on the circumstances of the case in which it
"52 Stat. 883, 904 (1938), 11 U.S.C.A. §§ 5o, 668 (Supp. 1938). Correspondingprovisions
are included in Ch. I Arrangements, Ch. XII Real Property Arrangements by Persons
Other than Corporations, and Ch. XII Wage Earner's Plans. They are respectively: §§ 395,
52o, 679, 52 Stat. 915, 929, 938 (1938), 11 U.S.C.A. §§ 795, 920, ,079 (Supp. 1938).
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arises.2 The law on this point represents a compromise based upon competing
considerations of fiscal theory, accounting practice, public policy, and convenience. The resulting uncertainty is illustrated by the leading cases on income
resulting from the discharge of obligations.
In Bowers v. Kerbaugh-Empire Co.3 the defendant was able to repay a
loan from a German bank with depreciated marks at a saving of $70o,ooo. The
Court held there was no taxable gain realized because the transaction as a whole
resulted in a loss, i.e., the borrowed funds were turned over to a subsidiary
which lost them in its operations over a five year period. The Court said:
"Mere diminution of loss is not gain, profit, or income."' 4 A subsidiary ground
for the decision was the apparent conclusion that the retirement of obligations
for less than the amount originally received is not income within the Eisnerv.
Macomber definition of income as "the gain derived from capital, from labor,
"s On the authority of the Kerbaugh case the
or from both combined, . .. ".
cancellation of indebtedness as a result of a composition with creditors was held
6
not to result in taxable income.
In X931 the authority of the Kerbaughcase was weakened by the decision in
Burnet v. Sanford & Brooks Co.7 In this case the defendant, engaged in carrying
out a dredging contract, sustained losses which were deducted from income
each year. Later the losses were recovered from the other party to the contract.
The Court agreed with the Commissioner of Internal Revenue that the amount
recovered was part of the taxable income for the year in which it was received.
In distinguishing the Kerbaugh case, relied on by the defendant, the Court remarked that there the taxpayer had not received any money or property which
could be made subject to a tax. It was further pointed out that in the instant
case there were no capital investments "the cost of which, if converted, must
first be restored from the proceeds before there is a gain taxable as income."
The controlling factor in the opinion of the Court was the practical necessity
that each year's income and losses be treated separately, for it is on that basis
that the Revenue Acts have uniformly proceeded.'
In United State v. Kirby Lumber Co.9 the Kerbaugh case was further limited.
4 Id. at i75.
3 27, U.S. 170 (1926).
to include
be
understood
it
"provided
continues:
definition
5 252 U.S. 189, 207 (1920). The
profit gained through a sale or conversion of capital assets, to which it was applied in Doyle v.
Mitchell Bros. Co., 247 U.S. 179, i85."
6 Meyer Jewelry Co., 3 B.T.A. 1319 (I926); Comm'r v. Simmons Gin Co., 16 B.T.A. 793
(1929) aff'd 43 F. (2d) 327 (C.C.A. ioth 193o); Burnet v. John F. Campbell Co., 15 B.T.A.
458 (1929) aff'd 5o F. (2d) 487 (App. D. C. 193).
2 391 C.C.H.

77.015 (1939)-

7 282 U.S. 359 (1931).

8 Id. at 364. The Court said: "The excess of gross income over deductions did not any the
less constitute net income for the taxable period because respondent, in an earlier period, suffered net losses in the conduct of its business which were in some measure attributable to
expenditures made to produce the net income of the later period."
9 284 U.S. i (1931).
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Here a corporation purchased and retired some of its own bonds for less
than the face value which was also the amount received upon the issuance of
the bonds. The Court held that to the extent of the difference between the face
value and the purchase price the corporation had realized taxable gain. The
justification offered was that the transaction "made available ....assets previously offset by the obligation of bonds now extinct." In Helvering v. American
Chicle Co.xo this principle was extended to a case where the taxpayer's obligations, which were retired, had been given to obtain specific property rather than
money. The circuit court of appeals thought that property so obtained stood
on a different basis from money and argued that one paying for property with
an obligation in the form of a bond realized no gain if the property remained in
kind after the obligation had been discharged at a book profit. Such discharge
was regarded as merely a reduction in purchase price or cost. The court said:
"The cost has indeed been definitely settled, but that is only one term of the
equation; as long as the other remains at large, there is no 'realized' gain.""
Although the Supreme Court purported to avoid passing on this question by
finding no facts on the record to show whether or not the assets still existed in
kind, its decision implicitly disapproves of the line of reasoning adopted by the
circuit court of appeals.
Prior to the Kirby case a reduction in liabilities was held not to give rise to
taxable gain even in the absence of proof that the whole transaction resulted in
a loss.' 2 The result in the latter situation apparently was based on the question-

able reasoning of the Kerbaugh case that a reduction of liabilities was not income. This view was definitely repudiated in the Kirby case and today a discharge of obligations at less than their face value is considered to be income,
with some qualifications. 13 The Kirby case is sound unless inroads are to be
291 U.S. 426 (1934) rev'g 65 F. (2d) 454 (C.C.A. 2d 1933).
"Comm'r v. American Chide Co., 65 F. (2d) 454, 455 (C.C.A. 2d 1933). Cf. Comm'r v.
Coastwise Transportation Corp., 71 F. (2d) 1o4 (C.C.A. ist 1934) where the facts were somewhat similar to the American Chide Co. case, except that there was a specific finding that the
property securing the indebtedness was still in existence. The circuit court of appeals reversed

the Board's holding (28 B.T.A. 725 (i933)) that a retirement of obligations at less than face

value was only a reduction in purchase price. The court held that the Kirby case and the
American Chide decision controlled the instant case and that the difference between the retirement price and the face value was taxable income. See also Coddon & Bros. Inc., 37
B.T.A. 393 (1938), 391 C.C.H.
77.M16 (i939). Cf. Montgomery, Federal Income Tax
Handbook 1'(i938); Note, 44 Yale L. J. 144 (1934).
X2Independent Brewing Co., 4 B.T.A. 870 (1926) and cases cited in Magill, Taxable Income
225, note 52 (1936). Of this line of cases the Board said, after the Kirby decision, in Consoli-

dated Gas Co. of Pittsburgh, 24 B.T.A. 901, 9o5 (i93i): "The scope of the decision in the

Kerbaugh-Empire Co. case is not so broad as was thought in deciding the line of cases beginning with Independent Brewing Co. of Pittsburgh, and that line of cases is no longer authority
for a situation such as exists in this case [purchase and retirement of bonds at less than the
issuing price]."
"3The Kirby decision has been followed in: Comm'r v. Norfolk Southern R. R. Co., 63 F.
(2d) 304 (C.C.A. 4 th 1933) (bonds purchased for less than par or issue price); Consolidated
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made upon the treatment of each year as a separate unit in determining income
for tax purposes. "The use of fixed accounting periods requires that the amount
by which expenses, once deducted because paid or accrued, are reduced by later
adjustments must be taken into account in the year of adjustment."'4 It is contrary to accounting principles to go back and alter original entries when the
amount of adjustment is ascertained. Looking at the transaction as a whole
violates the same rule and was expressly condemned in Burnet v. Sanford &
Brooks Co.'s Furthermore, under the accrual system losses in a given year will
be the basis of deductions from income in the year in which they occurred.
Why should they be permitted to offset income a second time under the discredited rule of "loss on the entire transaction"?
In the case of discharge of obligations of solvent debtors the courts and the
Board of Tax Appeals have generally followed the Kirby rule. 6 In the case of
insolvent debtors, the undesirability of taxing an insolvent or bankrupt has
resulted in an exception to the general rule. A statement in the Kirby case that
"the discharge of indebtedness there made available assets previously offset by
the obligation of bonds now extinct" has been interpreted to be a requirement
that only to the extent that the taxpayer has assets that are actually freed is
any taxable income realized. In operation, this rule creates a tax liability only
for the amount of the debtor's net worth, based on a fair market value of his
assets, after the composition or bankruptcy proceeding.'7 Logically the entire
write-off is taxable income, even though no assets are released.' 8 A determinaGas Co. of Pittsburgh, 24 B.T.A. goi (1931) (same); Woodward Iron Co., 24 B.T.A. io5o
(i93) (same); Suncrest Lumber Co., 25 B.T.A. 375 (1932) (same); Norfolk Southern R.R.
Co.,

25

B.T.A. 925 (1932)(same); Avery and Sons, Inc. 26 B.T.A. 1393 (1932) (cancellation in

part to adjust for defects in articles purchased); Comm'r v. Coastwise Transportation Corp.,
71 F. (2d) IO4 (C.C.A. ist 1934) (retirement of bonds by issue of new bonds of a lesser par
value); Walker v. Comm'r, 88 F. (2d) 170 (C.C.A. 5 th 1937).
'14B.
'S 282

F. Avery & Sons, Inc., 26 B.T.A. 1393, 1400 (1932).
16Cases cited note 13 supra.
U.S. 359, 364 (1931).

17Dallas Transfer & Terminal Warehouse Co. v. Comm'r 7o F. (2d) 95 (C.C.A. 5th i934);
Porte F. Quinn, 31 B.T.A. 142 (1934); Lakeland Grocery Co., 36 B.T.A. 289 (1937); Madison
Railways Co., 36 B.T.A. rio6 (1937). Cf. Towers and Sullivan Mfg. Co., 25 B.T.A. 922
(1932); Higley and Co., 25 B.T.A. 127 (1932) (forgiveness of debt held not income on basis of
the Kerbaugh, Simmons Gin Co., and John F. Campbell cases, all decided before the Kirby
case).
18 Finletter, Corporate Reorganization 488, note 21 (1937): "The rule that there is no taxable gain if the transaction as a whole shows a loss is based on the definition of income in
Eisner v. Macomber, 252 U.S. i89, the stock dividend case, as 'the gain derived from capital,
from labor, or from both combined.' Substance, not form, is to determine whether taxable
income has been received by the taxpayer. But, the holding that there is no real income derived
from a stock dividend in no way disproves the fact that the cancellation of a debt is income in
any sense of the word, regardless of what happened to the money originally received. If the
money was lost, it can be the basis of deductions from gross income for the years in which the
losses occurred. Even if the cancellation of the debt is accomplished through a judicial pro-

NOTES

tion of the extent to which assets are freed is contrary to the practice of determining gain or loss only as to the transactions dosed in the particular tax
year.
In revising the National Bankruptcy Act, Congress was convinced of the
undesirability of the existing tax law which frequently results in the imposition
of a tax on an insolvent debtor. Therefore, instead of codifying the existing law
Congress enacted an express exemption to prevent the imposition of any immediate tax liability on a taxpayer in the case of cancellation or reduction of his
indebtedness in (i) a corporate reorganization under section 77 B19 or Chapter
X of the Bankruptcy Act, as amended, or (2) a composition under old section
12 or section 74 of the amended Bankruptcy Act, or (3)
an "arrangement" or
"real property arrangement" under Chapters XI or XII of the amended
Bankruptcy Act, or (4)a "wage earner's plan" under Chapter XIII of the
amended Bankruptcy Act. Thus, section 268 of Chapter X states:
SEc.268.-Except as provided in Section 270 of this Act, no income or profit, taxable
under any law of the United States or of any State ....shall, in respect to the adjustment of the indebtedness of a debtor in a proceeding under this chapter, be deemed
to have accrued to or to have been realized by a debtor, by a trustee provided for in a
plan under this chapter, or by a corporation organized or made use of for effectuating
a plan under this chapter by reason of a ....cancellation in whole or in part of any
of the indebtedness of the debtor in a proceeding under this chapter.-o

II
While the wisdom of the legislative policy behind section 268 was conceded
by the Treasury Department, they insisted that the tax exemption as provided
be qualified to protect against tax avoidance and unwarranted tax reduction.cedure, it nevertheless represents real income to the debtor. It is true that it is most undesirable that there should be any income tax to the debtor as a result of a bankruptcy reorganization; and it is believed that the law is that there is no such tax. But, it is difficult to justify the
result on the premise that there is no profit to a debtor who is relieved of his debts, merely
because he lost the money which he received when the debts were created." Accord: Magill,
op. cit. supra note 12, at 212-31; 82 U. of Pa. L. Rev. 641, 645 (1934). Also see Coddon &
Bros. Inc., 37 B.T.A. 393 (I938), where the Board said: "Whether income will be realized
at the time of the partial forgiveness of the debt even if the property bought has a value less
than the remaining obligation, we do not now decide, but it seems clear that realization [of income] should not be postponed until disposal of the property."
'9 § 276 (c)
3, 52 Stat. 905 (1938), i U.S.C.A. § 676 (c)3 (Supp. 1938), provides that §§ 268
and 270 shall apply to any plan confirmed under 77B before the effective date of the amendatory act, and also to plans confirmed under 77B on and after such date. Similar provisions
are included in Chapters XI, XII, and XIII.
2*52 Stat. 904 (1938), ii U.S.C.A. § 668 (Supp. 1938). Corresponding provisions in the
other chapters are cited in note i supra. Effect has been given to all provisions in Treasury
Regulations ioi, Art. 22 (a)-14.
2"Hearings before a Subcommittee of the Senate Committee on the Judiciary on H.R. 8o46,
75th Cong. 2d Sess., 138, 144 (1938); Hearing before the House Committee on the Judiciary
on H.R. 8046, 75th Cong. ist Sess., 353 (1937).
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Congress passed section 269- to allow the Treasury to object to a plan on the
ground that one of its principal purposes was tax avoidance. To meet the other
objection of the Treasury the following section 270 was passed:
SEC. 27o.-ki determining the basis of property for any purposes of any law ....
the basis of the debtor's property.... or of such property .... as is transferred to any
person required to use the debtor's basis .... shall be decreased by an amount equal
to the amount by which the indebtedness of the debtor, not including accrued interest
unpaid and not resulting in a tax benefit on any income tax return, has been canceled
or reduced in a proceeding under this chapter .... 23
In illustrating the principle of this section the Treasury presented a supposititious case: Specific property (realty) is purchased at a price of $i,ooo,ooo.
$250,000 is paid in cash and the balance is secured by a purchase money mortgage for $75oooo. Later the company is unable to make its payments on the
mortgage. The company makes under the amended Bankruptcy Act an adjustment with the mortgagee in which the mortgage is scaled down by $250,000
to $Soo,ooo. The debtor corporation is then able to continue successfully.
Under section 268 the "write off" of $250,000 is non-taxable. But, it is asked,
what is the basis of the property for determining gain or loss on the sale of such
24
property? As defined by the Revenue Act the basis of property is its cost.
Here the contract price was $I,ooo,ooo, but, says the Treasury, "is it not perfectly clear that the basis (cost) ....
should be reduced from a million to
$75o,ooo because that is the amount which the corporation would actually have

paid for it?

''

2s

The reasoning adopted by the Treasury is hardly satisfactory. If the write
off is really a reduction in purchase price, then cost (i.e., debtor's basis) is determined by such write off to be $750,000. Any reduction by force of section
270 is unnecessary to give this result. Furthermore, the illustration fails to
indicate the full scope of the reduction in basis principle. Under section 27o, as
interpreted by the Commissioner in Art. 113 (b)-2 of Treasury Regulations
2252 Stat. 904 (1938), ii U.S.C.A. § 669 (Supp. 1938). Corresponding provisions are included in Chapters XI, XII and XIII. They are respectively: §§ 395, 521, and 679, 52 Stat.
915, 929, 938 (1938), 11 U.S.C.A. §§ 795, 921, 1079 (Supp. 1938). These provisions are not
identical with those of § 669. §§ 795, 921, and 1079 use "evasion of taxes" instead of "avoidance." §§ 795 and 1079 simply deny the exemptions from tax where a purpose to evade taxes
is shown, whereas §§ 669 and 921 provide the Treasury with an opportunity to object to the
confirmance of the plan.
23 52 Stat. 904 (1938), ii U.S.C.A. § 670 (Supp. 1938). Corresponding Sections in Chapters
XI and XII are §§ 396, 522, 52 Stat. 915, 929 (1938), Iz U.S.C.A. §§ 796, 922 (Supp. 1938).
24 § 113 (a), 52 Stat. 490 (1938), 26 U.S.C.A. § 113 (a) (Supp. 1938). This is also the basis
on which depreciation must be taken, Revenue Act of i938, § 114 (a), 52 Stat. 494 (1938),
26 U.S.C.A. § 114 (a) (Supp. 1938) :--"The basis upon which exhaustion, wear and tear, and
obsolescence are to be allowedinrespect of any property shall be the adjusted basis provided in
section 113 (b) for the purpose of determining the gain upon the sale or other disposition of
such property."
2SSenate Hearings note 21 suzpra, at 138.
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1o,26 there will not only be a reduction where the obligation was given in exchange for specific property which secures the indebtedness and is still owned,
but there will also be a reduction in basis where indebtedness secured by a lien
on specific property is canceled or reduced, even though such indebtedness was
incurred for purposes other than the purchase of the property. In either case,
after the basis of specific property has been reduced, the excess shall be used to
reduce pro rata the basis of other tangible property other than inventory and
any further excess shall be used pro rata to reduce basis of inventory, notes and
accounts receivable. The latter part of this regulation would, however, seem
inconsistent with the reduction of cost principle urged by the Treasury in support of section 270.
Such adjustment in the basis of many assets necessitates elaborate computation and it has therefore been suggested that an amendment to section 270
should be made limiting the application of the reduction in basis rule to assets
which secure the indebtedness forgiven.27 But, if in any case the reduction of
liabilities is income and Congress does not wish to tax it immediately, there
would seem to be no constitutional objection to later taxing that income as here
"through the depreciation or gain on sale route," whether accomplished by a
reduction in basis of assets which secure the debt or other assets. It has also
been suggested that, although a cancellation results in taxable income, it might
be unconstitutional for Congress to juggle arbitrarily the basis of assets which
are wholly unrelated to the cancellation for the purpose of later collecting that

income.28

Since the reduction of basis by the amount of cancellation of indebtedness
has been justified as the collection of a deferred income tax, a serious constitutional question is raised as to whether a cancellation of indebtedness is always
income within the meaning of the Sixteenth Amendment. More specifically,

26Art.

113 (b)-2 is new, promulgated in T.D. 4871, Nov. 9, 1938.

27Banks,

Treatise on Bankruptcy for Accountants 89 (1939); Senate Hearings note 21

supra, at 211 (letter written by Mr. Banks). Compare the statement in 82 U. of Pa. L.,

Rev. 641, 645 (1934): "Furthermore, in actual practice no general liability, once incurred, is
set off against a specific asset. General liabilities constitute a general claim on all assets. The
discharge of any one liability below book value does not affect any one asset; rather it affects
net worth. This leads to the conclusion that once property is received by the taxpayer and is
entered on his books as an asset, it should be divorced from any further connection with an
offsetting liability, so far as subsequent determination of income is concerned."
"8The analogy urged is the decision in Koshland v. Helvering, 298 U.S. 441, 447 (1936)
suggesting that this may be a valid objection. The Court, however, did not talk in constitutional terms; rather it said: "Congress having ....specifically declared that in taxing income arising from capital gain the cost of the asset disposed of shall be the measure of the
income, the Secretary of the Treasury is without power by regulatory amendment to add a
provision that income derived from the capital asset shall be used to reduce cost." Cf. the statement at 445, which treats the administrative interpretation (i.e. the Treasury Regulations) as
part of the statute, "when the Congress, presumably with that construction in mind, has reenacted the statute without change."

THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO LAW REVIEW

it has been argued that the exception to the general rule, which exception holds
that only to the extent that the taxpayer has assets which are actually freed is
any taxable income realized, is a constitutional requirement. Therefore, if the
full amount of reduction of an insolvent's liabilities, including that part not
freeing any assets, determines the amount of reduction in basis, the government
is, in effect taxing something which could not have been taxed at the time of the
cancellation.29

The analysis heretofore presented has attempted to show that the whole
amount of reduction in liabilities is income unless one departs from the practice
of considering each year as a separate period, or from the requirement that
gains or losses upon property shall not be determined until there is a closed
transaction regarding such property--that assets are not to be revalued each
year for determination of gain or loss. To hold otherwise would in effect permit
the debtor to charge off as a loss the unrealized shrinkage in value of his assets
against the gain arising from debt reduction.30
It should be noted further that section 270 nowhere uses the word "income"
as a restriction on the amount of reduction. Section 270 baldly states that
"basis .... shall be decreased by an amount equal to the amount by which
indebtedness .... has been canceled or reduced .... " Therefore, it may be argued that this deferred tax by means of reduction in basis can be constitutionally supported, not as an income tax, but as an excise.3'
The adjustment of indebtedness is not always accomplished by the composition or "write off" method. A common type of reorganization involves the
acceptance of stock, either in a new corporation or in the old debtor corporation
reorganized, in exchange for bonds, notes, etc. In one sense of the word the old
bond liability has been entirely canceled. Under a literal reading of section 270
the basis of assets would be reduced by the full amount of the canceled bond
liability. There is a widespread fear that this interpretation will be adopted.
This view seems unlikely, since the cancellation of a debt for which shares of
stock are issued has generally been regarded as a capital transaction from which
no gain is realized. 32 The harsh results of a literal interpretation may be avoided

39Alexander Tax News Letter,
30 See

vol. MI,no. i8 (November 18, z938).

note 18 supra.

31Springer v. United States, 102 U.S. 586 (i88o); Flint v. Stone Tracy Co., 220 U.S. 107
(1g91); Stanton v. Baltic Mining Co., 240 U.S. 103 (1g16). Cf. Pollock v. Farmers' Loan &
Trust Co., 157 U.S. 429 (1895), 158 U.S. 6ox (2895). On this problem generally see Brown, The
Nature of the Income Tax, 17 Minn. L. Rev.

127,

139 (1933); Magill, op. cit. supra, note 12,

at 305-29 (an excellent analysis of the "excise" theory which suggests that this theory is
limited to special cases, notably the mining cases).
32 Chicago Rock Island & Pacific R.R. Co. v. Comm'r, 47 F. (2d) 99o (C.C.A. 7th 1931)
aff'g 13 B.T.A. 988 (1928); 375 Park Avenue Corporation, 23 B.T.A. 969 (1931); Liquid Carbonic Corp., 34 B.T.A. 1191 (2936). Looking at this type of transaction from the other side,
the Board, in Howard W. Starr, i B.T.A. 682 (1925) held that stock receivedin "cancellation"

NOTES
by interpreting "cancellation" in section 270, so as not to include this type of
transaction. Further, if section 27o and the reduction in basis which it entails
is justified as a deferred income tax, this harsh result might be avoided by

recognizing that the cancellation of debt in the case of an exchange of bonds for
stock gives rise to no income. In fact, if this transaction were held to give rise
to income taxable under section 270, there would be a serious constitutional
objection.33 Conceivably, this objection will be avoided by adopting the theory
that the tax in this situation is an excise.34 However, the imposition of such a
tax only in bankruptcy cases might be invalid as "discriminatory."
In view of the above arguments in a reorganization in which bonds are exchanged for stock it is very unlikely that the Commissioner will attempt, or the
Board of Tax Appeals and the courts permit, the literal interpretation of the
word "cancellation" in section 270. Of course, where this reorganization involves
the elimination of some indebtedness, without any recognition in the plan, for
example, unsecured claims, then, granting the implied restriction of "income"
on section 270, still the basis will be reduced by the full amount of such claims.
Following the principle, previously outlined, that accounting periods should be
treated separately for purposes of determining gain or loss, their elimination
is income and reduction in basis is justifiable.S
Another suggested interpretation of section 270 is that the reduction in basis
shall be made only by the amount of cancellation or reduction which would have
resulted in taxable income, but for the provisions of section 268. It is argued
that this was the intent of Congress in passing section 27o and that an amendment to this effect should be made at once.36 Actually section 270 was passed as
drafted by the Treasury Department, and there were unsuccessful attempts to
amend section 270 to include this idea.37 The fact that section 270 was passed
as submitted by the Treasury indicates that Congress was willing to trust the
Treasury and the Treasury's failure to include the amendment is convincing
of a debt owed to the appellant (already a stockholder) was equivalent to the purchase of the
stock for the amount of the debt.
Some indication that the Treasury accepts this view is Art. 112 (g)-2 of Regulations ioI:
"A 'recapitalization,' and therefore a reorganization, takes place if, for example,
(r) A corporation with $2oo,ooo par value of bonds outstanding, instead of paying them
off in cash, discharges them by issuing preferred shares to the bondholders .......
33Namely, that by taxing the full amount of "canceled" bond liability by the reduction
in basis principle, a tax was being imposed on something which was not income within the
interpretation of "income" as "realized gain." Doyle v. Mitchell Bros. Co., 247 U.S. 179,
184 (i918); Eisner v. Macomber, 252 U.S. 189 (1920); Burnet v. Logan, 283 U.S. 404, 412
(1931). See Magill, op. cit. supra note 12, at 302-5, 312-16.
34 See

note

31

supra.

36Swanstrom, Chapter X 21o (r938). Banks,

3s See note 18 supra and text.
op. cit. supra note 27, at 81-99 (publishes a

letter from Congressman Chandler supporting this interpretation). Contra, McCaffrey, Corporate Reorganization, 26 Calif. L. Rev. 643, 662 (1938) (to the effect that it is immaterial whether such cancellation would have resulted in taxable income, but for the exemption of § 268).
37

Senate Hearings note 21 supra, 137, r44, 21o; Banks, op. cit. supranote

27.
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proof that the Treasury did not mean to limit the reduction in this way. The
effect of such a limitation would be to carry into the interpretation of section 270
the cases decided before the passage of section 268 establishing the rule that
cancellation of indebtedness is income only to the extent that assets are freed.
This rule is a court-imposed qualification and requires the evaluation of the
8
debtor's property to determine the amount of assets freed by the cancellation.3
Sections 268 and 270 may well have been designed to eliminate this requirement and, thus, to avoid the burden of proving the extent of the debtor's
solvency on the basis of a fair market valuation of his property. The only merit
to this suggested amendment is that by its inclusion the reduction of basis with
respect to indebtedness eliminated by the exchange of bonds for stock is definitely precluded, since before the passage of section 268, it was held that no
taxable income accrued to anyone in the exchange of stock for bonds. As
pointed out above the same result will probably be reached without an amendment.
Attention should be called to the words "shall be decreased by an amount
equal to the amount by which the indebtedness of the debtor, not including
accruedinterest unpaidand not resultingin a tax benefit on any income tax return,
has been canceled or reduced ...." The inclusion of the words in italics has been

cited as evidence that it was intended that the reduction of basis was to be
only by the amount of cancellation which was taxable income.39 This appears
to be a misconception. Rather their inclusion is simply a compromise in keeping with the idea of rehabilitation. The unpaid interest is a valid debt which if
canceled in favor of a solvent debtor would be taxable income. On principle
it is also income to the insolvent, but, says Congress, we will only tax by the deferred method of reduction in basis, that part of the canceled unpaid interest
which has resulted in a tax benefit. To illustrate: the annual interest on an
outstanding bond issue is $25,000. It has not been paid for two years, 1936 and
1937, and under a plan of reorganization the debt is extended and back interest
canceled. In the first year the accrued interest was used as a deduction to wipe
out taxable income of $1o,ooo and in the second year to wipe out taxable income
of $5,ooo. Thus, only $15,000, the portion of canceled unpaid interest which

has resulted in a tax benefit will be used to reduce basis.40
III
Hidden in section 270 is a clause which restricts the application of the reduction in basis provisions to certain types of reorganizations. It reads: "In determining the basis of property for any purposes of any law .... imposing a

tax upon income, the basis of the debtor's property ....or such property as
38Madison Railways Co., 36 B.T.A. iio6 (i937). See Magill, op. cit. supranote 12, at 229;
Montgomery, op. cit. supra note ii, at ii.
391Banks, op. cit. supra note 27, at go; Swanstrom, op. cit. supra note 36, at 211.
40 Ibid.
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is transferred to any person required to use the debtor's basis .... shall be decreased .....
4' Who is required to use the debtor's basis?4 This phrase is inserted to cover those reorganizations where a new corporation is used in order
to effectuate the plan or where the debtor's assets are transferred to an existing
corporation. The scope of the phrase is controlled by the Revenue Act, section
113(a) (7).43 The initial provision is that the basis shall be the cost of such property to the taxpayer and, if the taxpayer is a new corporation which acquired the
property by the issuance of its stock, the "cost" is the fair value of the property.
It is provided, however, that if the property was acquired in "connection with a
reorganization," as defined in the Revenue Act,44 then the basis shall be the
same as in the hands of the transferor, adjusted for the amount of gain or loss
recognized to the transferor in the transaction. To qualify as a reorganization
within the meaning of the Revenue Act a reorganization must fall within one
of five categories:
(A) a statutory merger or consolidation, or (B) the acquisition by one corporation
in exchange solely for all or a part of its voting stock: of at least 8o per centum of the
voting stock and at least 8o per centum of the total number of shares of all other
classes of stock of another corporation; or of substantially all the properties of another
corporation, or (C) a transfer by a corporation of all or a part of its assets to another
corporation if immediately after the transfer the transferor or its shareholders, or both,
are in control of the corporation to which the assets are transferred, or (D) a recapitalization, or (E) a mere change of identity, form, or place of organization, however
effected.45
Exchanges or transfers to a new corporation, consummated in pursuance to a
plan under Chapters X, XI or XII are not by force of the Bankruptcy Statute
within the meaning of a "statutory merger or consolidation" as defined in sec4'

The same phrase is also included in the corresponding sections of Chapters XI and XII.
3 (a) (Supp. 1938):

42Revenue Act of 1938, § 113 (a), 52 Stat. 490 (1938), 26 U.S.C.A. § i

-"The basis of property shall be the cost of such property; except that-." In § io6 of Chapter X, 52 Stat. 883 (1938), 11 U.S.C.A. § 506 (Supp. 1938) "debtor" is defined: "(5) 'debtor'
shall mean a corporation by or against which a petition has been filed under this chapter ......
43Revenue Act of 1938, § 113 (a) (7), 52 Stat. 490 (1938), 26 U.S.C.A. § 113 (a) (7) (Supp.
1938) :--"The basis of property shall be the cost of such property; except that(7) If the property was acquired-

(B) in a taxable year beginning after December 31, x935, by a corporation in connection
with a reorganization, then the basis shall be the same as it would be in the hands of the
transferor, increased in the amount of gain or decreased in the amount of loss recognized to the

transferor upon such transfer under the law applicable to the year in which the transfer was
made. This paragraph shall not apply if the property acquired consists of stock or securities

in a corporation a party to the reorganization, unless acquired by the issuance of stock or securities of the transferee as the consideration in whole or in part for the transfer."
44 § 112 (g), 52 Stat. 485 (938),
U.S.C.A. § 112 (g) (Supp. 1938):-"As used in this
section and section 113(i) The term 'reorganization' means.... "
41Ibid.
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tion 112(g) (i) (A).46 If such transactions do not fit under (B), (C), (D), or (E)
of 112(g) (i), then there is no reorganization within the meaning of Section
113(a) (7). It therefore follows that the new corporation is not "required" to
use the debtor-transferor's basis.47 Accordingly the provisions of section 270 do
not apply. Section 268 apparently would still prevent recognition of income to
the debtor (old corporation), trustee, or the new corporation, arising from a reduction of cancellation of indebtedness. The basis of determining gain or loss
and depreciation on the debtor's property in the hands of the new corporation
will, however, be the acquiring corporation's cost. If the property is acquired in
exchange for stock having no market value, then the cost will be a fair valuation
of the property acquired, but if acquired in exchange for stock having a market
value, then cost will be measured by the market value of the stock given.
The more common reorganizations employing a new corporation to continue
the enterprise can usually be fitted into one of the Revenue Act definitions.
The "foreclosure" type of plan, where the former bondholders become stockholders of the new corporation, has been held to be a reorganization within the
meaning of section 12(g) (i) (C).4 The Middle West Utilities reorganization
where the old corporation transferred its assets in exchange for voting stock of
the new corporation, which stock the old corporation distributed to secured
and unsecured creditors in satisfaction of their claims, was held to be a reorganization within section I12(g) (i) (B).49 The categories of reorganizations listed
in section I12(g) (i), however, are "artificial ones having little to do with its
usual connotations as a readjustment of the debt and ownership of corporate
property effected through judicial process. '"S° Until recently the policy of the

Treasury has been to construe this definition very strictly,5' but now when it is

to the interest of the government to collect a deferred tax by reducing basis
under section 270, the trend will probably be toward a broader interpretation.
Nevertheless, in some reorganizations under the Bankruptcy Act the new corporation will start with a basis of its own and will, of course, escape any reduction in basis under section 270.
46 392

C.C.H.

(digest of a Bureau letter); 383 C.C.H.
6044 (1938) (complete copy of letter).
47 McCaffrey, op. cit. supta note 36, at 662.
48 Comm'r v. Kitselman, 89 F. (2d) 458 (C.C.A. 7th 1937); Comm'r v. Newberry Lumber
7447.225 (1939)

and Chemical Co., 94 F. (2d) 447 (C.C.A. 6th 1938); Leckie, 37 B.T.A. 252 (1938); I.T. 2071,
111-2 Internal Revenue Bulletin 34 (i924). As to what reorganizations are within § I12(g) (i)

generally, see Finletter, op. cit. supra note x8, at 466-486; Baar and Morris, Hidden Taxes in
Corporate Reorganizations z-i6o (i935).

C.C.H. 747.355 (i939) (digest of Bureau letter).
sPFinletter, op. cit. supra note i8, at 471.
49,392

s"Treas. Reg. ioi, Art. 112 (g)-2:-"The application of the term 'reorganization' is to be
strictly limited to the specific transaction set forth in section 112 (g) (I)."

